Restrictive border protection policies directed toward managing the flow of refugees coming into neoliberal democracies (and out of failing nation-states) are a defining feature of contemporary politics. In this book, Verónica Tello analyses how contemporary artists-such as Tania Bruguera, Isaac Julien, Rosemary Laing, Dinh Q. Lé, Dierk Schmidt, Hito Steyerl, Lyndell Brown and Charles Green-negotiate their diverse subject positions while addressing and taking part in the production of images associated with refugee experiences and histories. Tello argues that their practices, which (...) manifest across a range of contexts including Cuba, the United States, Australia and Europe, represent an emergent, global paradigm of contemporary art, 'counter-memorial aesthetics'. Counter-Memorial Aesthetics, Tello argues, is characterized by its conjunction of heterogeneous signifiers and voices of many times and places, generating an experimental, non-teleological approach to the construction of contemporary history, which also takes into account the complex, disorienting spatial affects of globalization. Spanning performance art, experimental 'history painting', aftermath photography and video installation, counter-memorial aesthetics bring to the fore, Tello argues, how contemporary refugee flows and related traumatic events critically challenge and conflict with many existing, tired if not also stubborn notions of national identity, borders, history and memory. Building on the writings of such thinkers as Michel Foucault and Jacques Rancière, this book offers a useful concept of 'counter-memory' for the twenty-first century. It shows how counter-memorial aesthetics is not only central to the nexus of contemporary art and refugee histories but also how it can offer a way of being critically present with many other, often interrelated, global crises in the contemporary era. (shrink)

According to the philosophical posture for which every denial is a problem, I have decided, since it lacks here the space to justify such a posture, to propose a dialogue between three fictional characters.The first part of the dialogue relates to open and closed games. The value of closed answers (§1.1) is supreme (ultimate) because it resides in their undeniability meant as non-negativity. But the undeniability is conditioned, since it is such only insofar as one remains within a certain game. (...) This (§ 1.2) applies both to logical calculation and to empirical evidence, and therefore in general to science. The consequence (§ 1.3) is that philosophical questions, as open, are then unlimitedly open.The second part of the dialogue consists of a philosophical reading of the infosphere. It is possible (§ 2.1) to have an “apocalyptic” reading which, interpreting the infosphere as the final passage of technoscience, interprets it as the space in which even human mind is replaced by an artifice. Therefore (§ 2.2) the problem of “subjectivity” arises: what types of subjects are produced by the technique? And which types of new subjects are producing them?In conclusion (§ 2.3), the possibility of an alternative reading of the infosphere is announced; it is based on a thought capable of “opening up” even with respect to negation, which up to now seems to be the horizon that thought cannot overstep. (shrink)

Thanks to a careful reading of a key passage in Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism (PH II 134-170), this paper offers a sort of running commentary that makes clear some crucial aspects of the Pyrrhonian attack against any kind of subsistence or ὑπόστασις of the ἀπόδειξις. This notion (fundamental for the dogmatic approach to epistemological topics) will be examined in its main logical guidelines as well as in some of its historical declinations, especially from the point of view of ancient (...) Stoicism and its doctrine about the so-called non-demonstrable arguments. (shrink)

[ita]Completando un precedente articolo si analizza la concezione gnoseologica di Maurice Blondel, di cui viene respinta una interpretazione relativistica, pur riconoscendo in lui alcuni limiti, in particolare una eccessiva diffidenza verso il concetto. [eng] Completing a previous article, the gnoseological conception of Maurice Blondel is analyzed, and a relativistic interpretation of her is rejected, even if some of its limits are recognized, in particular an excessive diffidence towards the concept.

[ita] Blondel offre una prospettiva gnoseologica complementare al tomismo: se quest'ultimo sottolinea troppo la forza del concetto, Blondel da parte sua la relativizza un po' troppo. Tra le due prospettive occorre quindi cercare una sintesi. -/- [eng] Blondel offers a gnoseological perspective complementary to tomism: if the latter excessively underlines the strength of the concept, Blondel instead underestimates it. Between the two perspectives it is therefore necessary to seek a synthesis.

Darwin diceva che le specie si trasformavano per poter sopravvivere: arriva un terremoto, un’inondazione e solo chi sa correre rapidamente o chi sa nuotare vive. Ok, ma cosa ci dice questa teoria sui cambiamenti che non portano a migliori possibilità di sopravvivere o di riprodursi? Ben poco. Perché nel corso dei secoli i denti molari dell’uomo si sono ridotti di dimensioni, così come le dita dei piedi? Certo non per sopravvivere e riprodursi meglio. Gli autori riportano nel corso di questa (...) rassegna vari esempi che la teoria di Darwin non riesce a spiegare e delle possibili spiegazioni alternative, asseverate da esperimenti scientifici validati e consacrati dalla comunità scientifica. Darwin aveva torto? Certamente no! Ma come tutte le opere della scienza richiede revisioni e miglioramenti. (shrink)

Quel che è vero non è tale perché gli uomini hanno deciso così.

Molta filosofia moderna rifiuta l'idea di verità (filosofica) oggettiva, in quanto porterebbe alla violenza. Così ad esempio Derrida. Ma una corretta idea di verità oggettiva non ha questa implicazione di intolleranza.

Sylvia Wynter ends her monumental essay “‘No Humans Involved:’ An Open Letter to My Colleagues” (1994) with an urgent call to address the dire condition of the jobless and poor: “We must now undo their narratively condemned status.” Who are “we”? The sentence separates the university and its “narratively condemned” other. In fact, what the pronoun “we” in the open letter refers to is situated and far from universal, for it is “we in academia” that institute the Western imperial constructs (...) of race and class through “rigorous elaboration” of the present order of knowledge, the one that fails to register its misfits as humans, thus demoting them to the category of N.H.I. (“no humans involved”). I take Wynter’s letter as a point of departure by attending to its mode of address, its conscious use of the pronoun “we,” in light of her genealogy of the Eurocentric conceptions of humanity fundamentally entrenched in university vocation. In so doing, I re-raise the ethical and existential questions around the university, that is, its accountability for the enduring abjection of the N.H.I.-categorized Other, as well as the purpose and very reason for its being as an institutional structure. (shrink)

É preciso refletir sobre a formação do professor de Filosofia. É necessário olhar a própria prática dos cursos, o perfil dos alunos que os estão freqüentando, a inserção desses estudantes nas escolas, o tipo de Filosofia que nelas está sendo trabalhada, a receptividade que a Filosofia está tendo, os livros didáticos de Filosofia e o seu uso.

Unlike being as act of being, being as true does not seem to belong to the object of metaphysics but only to that of logic. However, according to Aquinas it has a greater extension and universality than the act of being (and it is well konwn that universality is a characteristic of the object of metaphysics). For whereas being as act of being is a passio entis, namely a property of things, being as true is, according to Aquinas (and Frege), (...) a passio enuntiationis, that is a property of propositions, including (true) propositions about negations and non-being, such as ‘non-being is non-being’. Being as true is expressed in terms of ‘it is the case that p’ or ‘it is true that p’, where p can be any (true) proposition. Being as true is made most clearly evident in the affirmative answer to a question, when we say ‘(sic) est’, where ‘est’ refers to the whole proposition put in question, and intends to express the existence of a relation between the content of the proposition and reality, which is in fact the truth. (shrink)

Focusing on the work of such artists as Tania Bruguera, Isaac Julien, Rosemary Laing, Dierk Schmidt, Hito Steyerl, Lyndell Brown and Charles Green, Veronica Tello argues that their practices represent an emergent paradigm of contemporary...

In this essay, I aim to examine Hölderlin’s theory of composition according to the thesis on the compatibility of poetic and philosophical practices. I interpret Hölderlin’s poetological fragments as a response to the epistolary exchange he had held with his master Schiller a few years earlier, concerning the dialectic between philosophy and poetry, enthusiasm and sobriety. I argue that Hölderlin’s fragments prompt us to consider poetry and philosophy as poiesis-based practices. Identifying creativity as their common destination allows one to postulate (...) the interaction between the two disciplines. I finally argue that aesthetics could be the place for this interaction. Hölderlin outlines a productive, namely aesthetic, theory of creation, in which boundaries between philosophy and poetry seem to interact rather than exclude. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to address the problem of the relationship between translation and art by relying on F. Hölderlin’s and W. Benjamin’s theories of translation. These theories, which at first appear to be opposed, are actually very close since they discuss both art and translation as marked by a linguistic and theoretical renunciation. In the first section, I demonstrate in what sense this relationship is fundamental for an aesthetic consideration of translation. The second section discusses the two (...) main reasons for the divergence between art and translation, focusing especially on the philosophical limitations of Hölderlin’s theory as indicated in Benjamin’s The task of the translator. In the third section, I deal with the commonalities of the two theories, which are both marked by the notion of linguistic failure. I argue that Benjamin’s juvenile essay On language as such can be approached from a confrontation with Hölderlin’s lyric Patmos. In the fourth and last section, I conclude that the concept of the linguistic renunciation can mark both Hölderlin’s and Benjamin’s theories of translation. I finally argue that renunciation can be attributed to both art and translation, which are therefore intimately related critical activities. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to address the problem of the relationship between translation and art by relying on F. Hölderlin’s and W. Benjamin’s theories of trans- lation. These theories, which at first appear to be opposed, are actually very close since they discuss both art and translation as marked by a linguistic and theoretical renunciation. In the first section, I demonstrate in what sense this relationship is fundamental for an aesthetic consideration of translation. The second section discusses the (...) two main reasons for the divergence between art and translation, focusing especially on the philosophical limitations of Hölderlin’s theory as indicated in Benjamin’s The task of the translator. In the third section, I deal with the commonalities of the two theories, which are both marked by the notion of lin- guistic failure. I argue that Benjamin’s juvenile essay On language as such can be approached from a confrontation with Hölderlin’s lyric Patmos. In the fourth and last section, I conclude that the concept of the linguistic renunciation can mark both Hölderlin’s and Benjamin’s theories of translation. I finally argue that renun- ciation can be attributed to both art and translation, which are therefore inti- mately related critical activities. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Abailard and Non-Things MARTIN M. TWEEDALE On SEVERAL OCCASIONSin his logical writings Abailard extracts himself from embarrassing ontological implications of his analyses of language by resorting to the notion of a something that is not a thing. I shall note here two such occasions and then discuss Abailard's explanations of this procedure based on the grammatical distinction of personal and impersonal constructions. Since the texts on this latter topic (...) are especially confusing, a considerable portion of my effort will be spent on making sense of them as preparation for drawing some conclusions about Abailard's overall approach. My purpose here is to show how Abailard's grammatical analyses are fundamental to his defence of a number of metaphysical positions. I also want to suggest that Abailard's grammatical approach, especially on the question of dicta, contains insights of continuing interest. Not all of Abailard's non-things are particularly associated with analyses of language. For instance, there are the likenesses the mind supposedly constructs for itself in order to think of things that are not being perceived. These Abailard calls fictive things (res ficta), and he refuses to give them the status of real psychological entities. ~ The likenesses are compared to mirror images which Abailard is also willing to treat as non-things. However, I wish to restrict my discussion here to cases which arise from Abailard's analysis of the reference of certain words. One such instance occurs in his discussion of universals. The peculiar nonthing here is the "state" (status), which, Abailard maintains, is "the common cause by which the universal word is imposed"7 Abailard is very careful to dis1Glossae super Porphyrium, in Peter Abelards philosophische,.gchriIten, edited by Geyer (henceforth referred ~o as Geyer), Miinster i. W., 1919 (BGPM, vol. 21), pp. 20-21, ll. 23-32: Intellectus autem sicut nec corporeo indigens instrumento est, ita /nec/ necesse est eum subiectum corpus habere in quod mittatur, sed rei ~dmilitudine contentus est, quam sibi ipse animus conficit, in quam suae intelligentiae actionem dirigit. Unde turr,~ destructa vel remota sensus qui in earn agebat, perit, inteUectus autem permanet rei similitudine auimo retenta. Sigut autem sensus non est res sentita, in quam dirigitur, sic nec intellectus forma est rei quam concipit, sed intellectus actio quaedam est animae, unde intelligens dicitur, forma vero in quam dirigitur, res imaginaria quaedam est et ficta, quam sibi, quando vult et qualm vult, animus conficit.... 11.9-17: Quaero enim, utrum flla quadratura et ilia altitudo vera forma sit intellectus, qui ad similitudinem quantitatis turris ducatur et compositionis eius. Sed profecto vera quadratura et vera altitudo non nisi corporibus insunt, ficta etiam qualitate nec intellectus nec ulla vera essentia forrnari potest. Restat igitur, ut sicut ficta eat qualitas, ficta substantia sit ei subiecta. Fortasae autem et ea speculi imago, quae visui subiecta apparere videtur, nihil esse vere dici potest, quoniam scilicetin alba speguli superficie contrarii coloris qualitas saepe apparet. Ibid., pp. 19-20,II. 14-16- ~ad nunc ea quae breviter tetigimus, diligenter perquiramus, scilicet quae sit iIla communis causa, secundum quam universale nomen impositum est.... 11. 21-29. Singuli homines discreti ab invicem, gum in propriis differant tam essentiis quam formis, ut supra meminimus rei physicam inquirentes, in eo tamen conveniunt, quod homines aunt. Non dico in homine, gum res nulla sit homo uisi discreta, sed in esse hominem. Esse autem hominem non est homo nec res aliqua, si diligentius consideremus, [329] 330 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY tinguish three different questions frequently confused in discussions on universals. The first is "What is 'universal' predicated of?", and the answer is simply words --words not in the sense of mere marks or sounds, but of meaningful marks or sounds. Another is "How do we have an idea associated with universals?" Here the aforementioned likenesses enter as that by which the mind can have an idea applicable to many individuals. But there is also the question of what makes a certain word correctly applicable to many things. Abailard does not make the error of thinking that an idea in the mind or some operation of the mind could possibly be the cause, as some conceptualists seem to think. This would lead to the conclusion that... (shrink)

"Music before all else..." yes, but what music, when the last century focused on discussing the very concept itself? This work studies the passage from modern art to contemporary art while considering the fundamental transformations of the musical paradigm.

Pensamiento y acción se unen y refuerzan mutuamente en el feminismo. Las consignas escritas de las pancartas y coreadas en las manifestaciones y los textos de las teóricas no son mundos separados. Por el contrario, son dos formas de la fuerza transformadora del mundo que llamamos feminismo. ¿Qué puede ser mejor para festejar los 30 años de la Colección Feminismos que un libro aniversario en el que más de 40 autoras y autores de reconocido prestigio reflexionan a partir de lemas (...) y citas que nos son familiares? En los últimos años, caracterizados por un nuevo auge del movimiento, estos lemas y citas circulan por las redes sociales y acompañan las movilizaciones del 8 de marzo y de otros momentos clave de las reivindicaciones de las mujeres ante la injusticia patriarcal. (shrink)

Filosofía y cultura novohispana -- Un tema de antropología filosófica : los indígenas americanos son seres humanos -- Humanismo novohispano -- Colofón : "Indio".

Ce livre étudie le paradigme musical qui traverse le romantisme allemand, le symbolisme français et le formalisme de la fin du xixe siècle. Sous l'hypothèse de la musicalité, il propose un modèle transversal d'analyse des arts et replace le symbolisme dans le cadre d'une histoire des formes esthétiques.

The Reign of Quantity gives a concise but comprehensive view of the present state of affairs in the world, as it appears from the point of view of the 'ancient wisdom', formerly common both to the East and to the West, but now almost entirely lost sight of. The author indicates with his fabled clarity and directness the precise nature of the modern deviation, and devotes special attention to the development of modern philosophy and science, and to the part played (...) by them, with their accompanying notions of progress and evolution, in the formation of the industrial and democratic society which we now regard as 'normal'. Guénon sees history as a descent from Form (or Quality) toward Matter (or Quantity); but after the Reign of Quantity-modern materialism and the 'rise of the masses'-Guénon predicts a reign of 'inverted quality' just before the end of the age: the triumph of the 'counter-initiation', the kingdom of Antichrist. This text is considered the magnum opus among Guénon's texts of civilizational criticism, as is Symbols of Sacred Science among his studies on symbols and cosmology, and Man and His Becoming according to the Vedanta among his more purely metaphysical works. (shrink)

In Parmenides’ B 8 37–41, we find a question that raises a difficult problem: how can Parmenides handle the opposition between “being and not” in the same way as the oppositions which characterize the mortals’ opinions? This question is especially relevant for answering the following theoretical question: how do we to treat the fundamental philosophical question of oppositions at large? To answer these question we need to reinterpret some major points of Parmenides’ thought: the second part of his poem, but (...) also the identification of πέλειν and εἶναι in B 6 8, as well as other passages of the poem. But, above all, the question makes us introduce some distinctions within the concept of negation and, consequently, between difference and negation. This allows us to distinguish the affirmation of the truth of being from the negation of the negation of being. This distinction has a major philosophical relevance, as can be seen by referring it to such thinkers as Plato, Hegel and Heidegger. (shrink)

Worldwide wisdom teaches, and philosophy demonstrates, that universally valid is only the perspective able to recognize everybody’s right to be treated in a just manner. From this point of view we have to recognize that all propositions are in some sense true, and hence that even those who are wrong are, from a particular point of view, right. Therefore, we have the duty to understand in which sense even populist stances are, at least in some sense, true. For instance, they (...) can help us to keep in mind the limits of democracy and, in this way, to escape the dangerous “democratic superstition.”. (shrink)

A study of the constitution and development of the human being from the metaphysical point of view, with special reference to Vedantic doctrine.

Description: Contents: Preface 1. General Remarks on the Vedanta 2. Fundamental Distinction Between The Self and the Ego 3. The Vital Centre of the Human Being, Seat of Brahma 4. Purusha and Prakriti 5. Purusha Unaffected by Individual Modifications 6. The Degrees of Individual Manifestation 7. Buddhi or the Higher Intellect 8. Manas or the Inward Sense : The Ten External Faculties of Sensation and Action 9. The Envelopes of the Self ; The Five Vayus or Vital Functions 10. The (...) Essential Unity and Identity of the Self in all the States of the Being 11. The Different Conditions of Atma in the Human Being 12. The Waking State or the Condition of Vaishwanara 13. The Dream State or the Condition of Taijasa 14. The State of Deep Sleep or the Condition of Prajna 15. The Unconditioned State of Atma 16. The Symbolical Representation of Atma and its Conditions by the Sacred Monosyllable Om 17. The Posthumous Evolution of the Human Being 18. The Reabsorption of the Individual Faculties 19. Differences in the Posthumous Conditions According to the Degrees of Knowledge 20. The Coronal Artery and the Solar Ray 21. The Divine Journey of the Being on the Path of Liberation 22. Final Deliverance 23. Videha-mukti and Jivana-mukti 24. The Spiritual State of the Yogi : The Supreme Identity. (shrink)

Buddhist concepts of personal life and responsibilities.